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Wybo Houkes’s paper suggests that our knowledge of an artefact’s possible and proper
functions is unlike the kinds of knowledge that epistemological theories usually focus on.
The diﬀerences concern the ways in which the information on which this knowledge is
based relates to practical reasoning. One’s ﬁrst reaction might be that this gets things back-
wards. The link to practical reasoning comes after one has formed the belief that some-
thing is, say, a corkscrew, not before, in the formation of the belief. For it does seem
obvious that once one has decided or discovered that something is a corkscrew then one’s
thinking about how to ﬁll one’s glass is richer. On the other hand one can learn that some-
thing is a corkscrew in ways that don’t seem at all unusual: reading the label on the pack-
age, asking in the store for a corkscrew, desperately trying everything in a drawer until
something gets a grip on the cork, and so on. To stop with this reaction, though, would
be to miss Houkes’s main point. That point can be put in the form of a mini-transcenden-
tal argument. (a) We do know what things are for; we know that a variety of things of
extremely varied shapes are corkscrews. (b) If we took beliefs about the functions of arte-
facts to be based on the usual kinds of empirical evidence, straightforward testimony, and
inference to the best explanation, then we would not have nearly as much knowledge of
what things are for as we seem to. (c) Therefore we must acquire such knowledge in some
other way, investigating which may tell us something interesting about knowledge in gen-
eral. Houkes takes this a step further, to (d) the best suggestion about how we come to
know the functions of artefacts is that we do so by making use of our capacities for prac-
tical reasoning—conceptualizing and prioritizing our aims, thinking out actions that might
satisfy those aims, and then choosing among the actions.
In this commentary I shall begin with an example that provides support for (b). This
will lead to reﬂections that lead to something like (d).
You are spending the weekend in a cabin in the woods, hoping that the isolation will
help you overcome a philosophical writing block. But the owner of the cabin is obsessed
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You’re sure there’s a telephone, but nothing looks like a phone. There isn’t even an iden-
tiﬁable bed. There is no one to ask; nothing is labelled. You ﬁgure things out, by trial and
a lot of error, to the extent that by the end of the weekend you have cooked a meal or two,
washed the dishes, slept, shaved, showered. On the other hand you have ingested some
frightful substances, broken some bottles in fury, spilled baked beans all over the ﬂoor,
and spent a very uncomfortable night. (The ﬁrst one. By the second night you have rea-
lised that what you had thought was a freezer was in fact a very comfortable bed.) But
now you know how to open bottles and cans, cook a meal, and sleep comfortably.
On Monday morning the owner arrives. He is impressed with your discoveries and
amused by your failures. He tells you that what you had taken to be an infuriatingly inef-
fective corkscrew is in fact a tooth-ﬂoss-holder, and what you had taken to be a pair of
toothbrushes is/are in fact the long-searched-for corkscrew. (One has to insert the handles
down the sides of the cork, whereupon the ‘brushes’ interlock and set up a shaking motion
that eases the cork upwards. It works marvellously.) You say ‘ah, now I see what that is’,
‘it’s really an Ethernet connector’ and so on1.
The ﬁrst stage of your investigation of the cabin leads you to know how to do a range of
things. To that extent you know what functions some of the objects in the cabin can per-
form. Knowing how is related to propositional knowledge, knowing that, in complex and
controversial ways. One uncontroversial fact is that people who know how to do some-
thing will often not be able to describe how they do it in words. Any beliefs they have
about the actions that lead to the desired end are not conscious or not expressible in lan-
guage available to them. And very often the verbal descriptions they can produce are false.
(So the issue is complicated by diﬀerences about what is to count as belief, and about
whether only information that counts as belief can be known.) So when by trial and error
one discovers, for example, that that thing that looks like a hunting knife with a peculiar
notch near the handle can be used as a can opener, one has both learned how to open cans
with it and learned that opening cans is one of its possible functions.
Though acquiring the skill of using an object to achieve an end can give one the knowl-
edge how to use the object, it is not the only way. One can know how to use a can opener
even though one does not have the use of one’s hands. As a result knowing how—and
knowing the function of an object—does not require one to have the corresponding skill.
At one point Houkes seems to deny this, saying that ‘use know-how can thus be analysed
as having two components: knowledge that a sequence of actions leads to the realisation of
a goal, and the skills needed to take these actions’. But I think a slight reformulation can
handle this. We ought to say that use know-how can depend to varying degrees on two
components: knowledge that some actions of some type lead to a goal, and knowledge
how to choose more ﬁnely grained actions of that type to achieve the goal. And then
we can say that a standard way of demonstrating, and of acquiring, the knowledge-how
component is via a corresponding skill. So at one extreme we have the case of the non-
musician who knows that one function of a trumpet is to produce higher notes than a tuba
can, but couldn’t begin to produce them. And at the other extreme we have the case of an
acrobat who knows that one function of the unicycle is to get across the tightrope, but has
no idea how she manages to do this.1 I hereby copyright any ﬁlm plots arising from this commentary.
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I take it that this conclusion, that learning the possible functions of artefacts is closely
linked to learning how to do things with them, is not controversial. (Note that there is no
diﬀerence at this stage between knowing the possible functions of artefacts and of natural
objects. One can learn how to open a can with a stone.) But it says nothing about how one
acquires this particular kind of how-knowledge. The obvious suggestion is: by trying. One
does various things with an artefact and eventually manages to achieve an end, and after
some practice gets to the state of being able reliably to achieve it, knowing how. I think
this leaves something out, though, and that is the global relationships between functions.
An artefact-type comes into a world already full of artefacts being used for various pur-
poses. (Comparison: a new biological species evolves into a world already containing other
species ﬁlling and deﬁning many niches.) There is more point inventing something that
does something new, or does a better job at something that existing artefacts do, than
there is inventing yet another mediocre way of opening a bottle. And the artefact must
do the job without preventing pre-existing artefacts from fulﬁlling their functions. In
thinking about the function of a mystery object, then, one can get a lot of guidance from
knowledge of the functions of other objects in its environment of use: it has to ﬁt into a
pattern with them. This is one reason that the cabin problem is hard: so many of the arte-
facts in the cabin are new that the weekend guest cannot identify the function of any one of
them by seeing what obvious gap there is in the familiar functions of the other ones. All
the same, this kind of holistic consideration does apply in a more subtle way to cabin-type
situations. Suppose that the guest tentatively assigns a function to some object. The guest
will later assign functions to other objects, under the constraint that the whole set of func-
tions has to ﬁt together in a coherent way. If the function of a newly considered object
duplicates that of the object tentatively labelled earlier then it is likely that one or the other
of them has been mis-labelled.
Notice that in simply trying to get through a weekend without starving one does not
have to engage very deeply with these questions of the overall pattern of functions. For
an object used in the wrong way may do the job well enough. Note also that the range
of objects found in a cabin is not likely to be great enough to support very conclusive rea-
soning from overall pattern to individual function, though it is unlikely that all of the
objects will be can openers or pot scrubbers. And, thirdly, notice that this kind of reason-
ing will not be very eﬀective when the purposes in question are aesthetic. Almost anything
can, for example, be used to make an interesting noise, and the variety of combinations of
interesting noise that might be of aesthetic interest is wonderfully unlimited. So if the
designer who stocked the cabin is not of the ‘form follows function’ school then the guest
who wants to make the transition from simple survival to knowledge of functions faces a
much harder task.
When we move to considerations about the overall pattern of functions we are consid-
ering proper functions as well as possible functions. For it is proper functions that are ﬁt-
ted into patterns. An inventor tries to create something that serves a new task or serves an
existing task better, and these tasks become the proper functions of the invention. (Not
that the inventor’s intention is indefeasible. There are many artefacts which, like duct tape
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erally accepted function.) So when we discover what an artefact can be used for by con-
sidering the functions of other ‘nearby’ artefacts we are reasoning from their proper
functions to its proper function to its possible functions. I think that this is one reason
why Houkes breaks oﬀ his discussion of possible function to consider proper functions:
many of the interesting epistemological routes to possible function pass through proper
function.
What intellectual capacities are needed in order to carry out this kind of reasoning? If
we transported Leonardo da Vinci through time to a modern car repair shop, could he
come to understand what the various tools are for? If what Houkes is saying is correct,
the answer is: no, mechanical genius would not be enough. In order to appreciate the func-
tions of modern tools Leonardo would have to appreciate the range of functions and sub-
functions in terms of which designers and users of tools in modern life operate. The kind of
knowledge involved is rather like moral knowledge on John McDowell’s picture of it,2 or
knowledge of other people’s characters. That is, in order to be in a suitable position to
have the knowledge one has to be living a certain kind of life, one which is deﬁned in part
by the fact that people manage it by means of this kind of knowledge. The relation
between the knowledge and the grounds for it is at ﬁrst sight circular. And perhaps at last
sight it is too, though this is something that will take a lot of arguing and disambiguating.
To know what the functions of things are one has to be embedded in a context of artefact
use, in fact in the context for which the objects were intended, which makes things diﬃcult
for archaeologists and time travellers.
Suppose this is right. Does it show, as Houkes argues, that ‘a full account of knowledge
of proper functions should describe a network of responsibilities, reasons and restrictions’?
(Is (d), above, true?) A big yes and two small nos. Yes if this is a way of saying that in
order to ascribe proper functions—and probably possible functions too—one has to have
a complex background knowledge which is normally acquired by membership in the soci-
ety which uses artefacts of many related kinds. No if it is meant to exclude the very unli-
kely possibility that one could acquire this background knowledge ‘archaeologically’
without membership in the society, let alone practical use of the artefacts. (I mean we
shouldn’t beg questions about how much we could learn at a distance. They’re hard ques-
tions.) No also if it is meant to suggest that the person who knows about artefacts must
accept and observe the standard system of responsibilities and restrictions. Gangsters
know about guns, hackers know about computers, conceptual artists know about cars,
coﬃns, and whatever else they use to peculiar eﬀect. But the Yes is more important than
the Nos: we usually know about the functions of artefacts because we can ourselves carry
out a variety of social functions, which provide us with some routes to knowledge that we
ought to understand better.
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